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From Welfare to Work: Does it Make Sense?
ANN E. KERLIN
Illinois State University
Department of Social Work
A great deal of thought and energy currently is being fo-
cused on moving welfare recipients off welfare and into the
job market. This article reports the results of a study of the
work versus welfare choice of women who are limited to the
minimum wage job market. Due to the level of the minimum
wage, these women face poverty even when working full time.
Working often brings them little financial benefit compared to
being on welfare, and does not include important benefits such
as health coverage for their children. one might ask, then, why
women facing this choice would be motivated to try to enter
the labor market at all. This study was designed to understand,
from the women's point of view, what keeps them in the la-
bor market under these conditions, and to shed light on their
perceptions of the work versus welfare choice.
The data obtained in this study indicate that a segment of
women on welfare may be more motivated to work than is
commonly recognized, and that federal welfare policy, instead
of supporting this motivation, appears to obstruct it.
Women and Welfare
When our current welfare system began, it was not expected
that single mothers would work (Abramowitz, 1989). It was as-
sumed that most of these women were widows, which touched
the sympathy of the public. In addition, it was the norm at
that time for women to stay home and care for children. In
the decades since then, much has changed. The large majority
of women now on welfare are divorced, separated, or never-
married women (Duncan, 1984). Also, women have been en-
tering the labor market at an ever-increasing rate since 1950,
and women with young children are no exception (Wattenberg,
72 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
1986). Consequently, there is a growing consensus that wel-
fare mothers should enter the labor market and become self-
supporting (Kamerman, 1984).
In the 1960s, policy makers began to devise mechanisms
to encourage welfare mothers to become self-supporting (Hill,
1982; Kamerman, 1984). One of these was a work-incentive that
was built into the program called Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) in 1967. The work-incentive functioned
like a wage supplement, to augment sub-poverty level wages.
By this mechanism, when a welfare recipient found a job, her
welfare check and Food Stamps were reduced by a proportion
of her earnings. If her earnings increased, her welfare benefits
would get smaller, eventually shrinking to zero. At each point,
however, it was economically more advantageous to combine
work and welfare than to be full-time on welfare.
Table 1 shows a typical work incentive scheme, in which
the recipient's welfare benefit is reduced by 50% of earnings. For
instance, if the recipient earns $100, the welfare check is reduced
by $50. It also shows what happens to the welfare benefit when
there is no work-incentive built into the model, and the benefit
is reduced by the amount of money earned.
The impact of a work incentive model on a woman moving
from welfare to a part-time or low-wage job becomes clear.
Table 1
Total Income at Various Levels of Earnings, with Work Incentive Present
and Work Incentive Absent
WORK INCENTIVE PRESENT WORK INCENTIVE ABSENT
Monthly Welfare Total Monthly Welfare Total
Earnings Benefit Income Earnings Benefit Income
$ 0 $300 $300 $ 0 $300 $300
100 250 350 100 200 300
200 200 400 200 100 300
300 150 450 300 0 300
400 100 500 400 0 400
500 50 550 500 0 500
600 0 600 600 0 600
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Whether she earns $100 or $500 a month, she is always better off
working than not working. Finally, at $600, she no longer gets
a supplement from welfare; however, by that time her income
is twice what it would be if she stopped working and went
back on welfare.
In 1981, the Reagan administration took some initiatives to
reduce expenditures in the AFDC budget and the work incen-
tive was cut at that time (Levitan, 1985). The work incentive
was reduced, and most of it was eliminated after 4 months of
employment. It is eliminated entirely after 12 months of employ-
ment. At this point, the recipient is usually off the welfare rolls
entirely. A major implication of this is that she is then facing the
end of medical coverage for herself and her children which was
an automatic part of being on welfare. Recent legislation (Family
Support Act of 1988) has enabled Medicaid to provide family
medical coverage for 12 months after a woman leaves welfare.
However, the reality of the job market facing these women is
that after twelve months of employment, they are still not in
a position to purchase medical coverage, and few of the jobs
available to them include such benefits as coverage for families.
The Low-wage Job Market
Understanding the nature of the job market available to
most women on welfare sheds light on the work versus wel-
fare choice they face. The dual labor market model (Doeringer
and Piore, 1975) describes a primary and secondary labor mar-
ket. In the primary sector, where the majority of Americans
work, the jobs offer relatively steady, full-time employment,
fringe benefits, and a wage above the poverty level. Frequently
these jobs are covered by collective bargaining, annual con-
tracts, and include benefits such as health coverage, sick leave,
and retirement.
Jobs in the secondary market, however, do not have these
characteristics. They have low wages, and few benefits. Fre-
quently, they are structured at less than full-time (35 hours
per week or less) so that the employers are not obligated to
provide health insurance or sick leave (Ellwood, 1988). Lack
of health coverage is particularly important to poverty-stricken
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single mothers. In Illinois, the site of this study, it is estimated
that 25% of previous welfare recipients who leave work and
return to welfare do so to obtain medical coverage for their
children (Taylor, 1987).
Bluestone and Harrison (1986) have pointed out that while
our economy created millions of new jobs during the 70s and
early 80s, nonetheless unemployment and the poverty rate both
remained high. This is due to two factors, one residing in
population demographics, the other in the nature of the jobs
being created.
The growth of the labor force has surpassed the rate of job
creation, due to the coming of age of the children of the postwar
baby boom, and due to the influx of women into the labor mar-
ket since the Second World War. Consequently, although in 1987
the Reagan administration cited 20 million new jobs created in
the previous decade, the unemployment rate remained above
7% during that time, and was frequently higher (Bluestone &
Harrison, 1987).
Second, and fundamental to the understanding of the per-
sistence of poverty in our country, is the fact that many of the
newly created jobs are low-wage jobs. Bluestone and Harrison
(1987) found that 44% of jobs created between 1979 and 1985
were at poverty-level wages or below. In addition, 30% of the
total new job growth consisted of part-time employment.
Thus, at a time when the job market was creating a pre-
ponderance of low-wage and part-time jobs, the work-incentive
that acted as a supplement to these wages for women leaving
welfare was abolished, leaving many recipients with the choice
of living in poverty on welfare or living in poverty while
employed.
Researchers looking at large data bases discovered that the
majority of women faced with these alternatives continued to
work after the abolition of the work-incentive, although it was
no longer financially profitable for them (Ellwood & Summers,
1985; Sarri, 1985; Wodarski, Parham, Lindsay, & Blackburn,
1986). This study was designed to understand, from the wom-
ens' point of view, what keeps them in the labor market given
these unrewarding circumstances, and to gain insight into their
perspective on the choice of work versus welfare.
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Research Design
A qualitative design was chosen to shed light on the issues
as seen from the point of view of the women: what, from
their point of view, are the advantages and disadvantages of
working in the secondary labor market as compared to being
unemployed and on welfare?
The design specified respondents who have had substantial
experience in the labor market. In other words, to qualify for the
study, the respondents had to have demonstrated the ability to
search for, find, and maintain a job. This was done to eliminate
women who are "employment-impaired" due to inadequate ed-
ucation, mental or physical illness, substance abuse, and so on.
A sample of twelve women was chosen. They all had both
experience being on welfare and experience in the low-wage
job market. A snowball sampling technique was used, with
the result that all the respondents were residents of two local
housing projects. All were Afro-American single women, with
one to four children. Of the twelve, all had become parents
before the age of twenty; all but two had their high school
diplomas, and only two had been previously married.
Of the sample, six were continuously employed during the
time of the study, two worked off and on, and four were unem-
ployed. Seven of the women had started working, at least part-
time, before their first child was born. Typically, the women
had held many jobs since they began working, although two
of the women had held the same job for four and five years,
respectively, and one respondent had been on her current job for
twelve years. With one exception, the women worked for wages
below $4.50 per hour, and frequently much lower than that.
The method used was in-depth interviewing on the topics
of work and welfare. The interviews took place over the course
of a year, and were held primarily in the women's homes. The
field work included many informal contacts with the women,
to establish trust and rapport, in addition to the structured
interviews.
The setting for the research was a midwestern town of
100,000. The town is characterized by a relatively low unem-
ployment rate compared to similar communities, due in part to
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the presence of a large state university, which provides numer-
ous jobs within the service sector.
As the research progressed, and initial answers began to
be formulated, the data was clustered into categories of Incen-
tives to Work and Disincentives to Work, and it is the primary
findings in these categories that are presented in this article.
Experiences of Work
What is common in the experience of the women is a wealth
of experience working, a variety of jobs, and an extremely flat
wage scale. One respondent, for instance, began work at age
14 in a small neighborhood supermarket. She worked almost
continuously for the next 13 years, in fast food restaurants,
pizza parlors, a plastics factory, as a nurse's aide, and as a
playground supervisor. only one of these jobs paid higher than
the minimum wage. (It paid $4.00 per hour at a time when
the minimum was $3.35). Most of the jobs were part-time, and
she frequently combined work and welfare. She took breaks
averaging six months for the births of her three children, born
when she was 16, 18, and 24. During these times, she was
entirely on welfare.
The reasons for frequent job changes are numerous and
difficult to generalize about: family needs, illness, frustration
with wages, personal conflicts with supervisors, hours being
cut, stores going out of business, and the discovery that in
some cases working made one poorer than being on welfare.
one respondent, who started working as a cafeteria helper in a
nursing home at age 15, quit her job four years later because
she had only had a total of $.25 per hour raise in that time.
During the time of the study, she was working two part-time
jobs for a total of more than forty hours per week, and was still
living below the poverty line.
Incentives to Work
The most surprising finding to emerge was not that the
women disliked their jobs (this was the expected response,
considering the nature of the jobs), but the extent to which
they enjoyed them. With one exception, all of the women had
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significant positive things to say about the experience of work-
ing. Five main themes emerged in the area of attitudes toward
working.
The first was labelled mingling: socializing with coworkers
and customers, meeting new people, being part of the hum and
rhythm of human encounters. The women said such things as:
-"I enjoyed working, period. You meet new people, and
you talk, you learn things automatically."
-"I've always liked those types of jobs, too, where you're
around people, do a lot of mingling... dealing with people,
and it kept me busy.... The people I worked with were real
nice. I enjoyed it. I was a cashier-I wasn't making nothing but
minimum wage. I would get a raise of ten cents whenever I
went for my review."
-"I worked at [a canning factory]. I worked there as a cut-
ter. That was fun, I mean everybody always worked there ... all
my girlfriends, they worked there."
-"It wasn't the work itself-I was crawling all up and
down under these machines. What I really enjoyed was, the
people I worked with all got along.... Everybody got along.
My supervisor was wonderful-you had to be, to put up with
me! To put up with me, you had to have a good sense of
humor!"
In addition to enjoying mingling, the theme of liking to be
busy emerged from the data. One respondent spoke of enjoy-
ing being active and productive, although she stated "I'm not
benefitting any," referring to her wages. She said:
-"[working] gives you something to do besides sitting at
home all day. ... I like to get out and meet people. I'm not
a late sleeper, I'm ready to go in the morning. I have to have
something to do." Another respondent stated that working:
-"gives you a sense of something, it makes you feel better,
to me. Even though the money's not great or anything. Just sit-
ting around here makes you think about your problems, about
how you wish you could get out. At least if you're working,
you have a little more self-esteem."
In addition to the personal feelings of enjoying mingling and
being busy that many spoke of, some were proud of working. One
woman, describing work at a fast food restaurant, said:
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-"I could do everything there, I could do everything. I
told them I wanted to learn everything. I could work the grill
during lunch hour, it was no problem to keep up, to keep it
going. It took time to learn how to do that. I knew how to call
production-you know, to keep the food going, to tell them
what we needed.
"I could do it all, I did a lot of other things that other people
didn't even do. I would make things for the store. Around
Christmas time, I made a stencil of Santa Claus. They kept it
for a long time. The manager finally had it cut out of plastic so
they could keep it for a long time."
Two of the women mentioned that how their children see them
affects their feelings toward working. They said:
-"Whereas now, I ain't got no job, I'm real discouraged
now. My kids are looking for me to have a job; other kids talk
about their mom and dad go to work. They say 'Your momma
on welfare'.... My kids used to me working.. ."
-"At first, they [the children] wanted me to be at home. I
explained to them that it was time for momma to get out there
and do something instead of sitting at home.... Now, they
like it. My daughters were telling me they don't want to be on
Public Aid, they want to work."
To some women, working gives a sense of independence and
control in their lives. For instance:
-"I just want a nice-paying job where I could pay all my
bills, and still have money left over, so I wouldn't have to mess
with Public Aid and all, I could be on my own.... What I
mean by being free is that I don't have to get anything at all
from Public Aid, no medical card, no Food Stamps, no cash, no
nothing. I'd like to do it all by myself."
Many other women spoke of the dream of being able to be
off welfare. One said,
-"I'd rather be off Public Aid. I really would.... You get a
high-paying job, you don't have to worry about them digging
in your business, you can live like normal. . . . You feel better
when you got your own money."
The women described incentives to work that can be de-
scribed as internal-that is, that address psychosocial needs.
They include the enjoyment of mingling, and of being busy, of
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pride in work, and looking good in the eyes of their children,
as well as the dream of being free of AFDC and in control of
one's resources.
Disincentives to Work
With these incentives pushing the women toward work,
what forces are operating in the other direction? Child care,
obligations to ill or elderly kin, and transportation are barriers
to employment that were mentioned, and these have been docu-
mented elsewhere (Stack, 1974; Wodarski et al., 1986). However,
the strongest, most universal response to the question 'What
forces operate against working in the lives of these women?' is
that they are no better off financially by working, and are often
worse off, especially when the loss of health care coverage is
factored in. This was documented repeatedly:
-... for me, when I was working, I found it to be harder
working because there's more debts. Your rent is more, and
you have all these different cuts on your Food Stamps and your
[AFDC] check, and then sometimes, you get cut off your medical
card, so that means you have to buy medicine and cover your
own doctor bills.... I wanted to work, but when I got off into
working, I felt like it wasn't, it wasn't really for me, because
by the time I got the money in my hands, somebody else was
getting it."
-" ... but if I had stayed on the job, they would have took
my medical card. My check got cut partly, and my Food Stamps
got cut."
-"When you work and go out and get yourself a job, and
it's a minimum-wage paying job, you're really defeating your
purpose as far as working, because you're just losing out on
everything. They snatch the medical card, they snatch the Food
Stamps, they snatch everything."
-"When you're working, they take it all away, even the
medical card. You work a minimum-wage job, and if your child
is sickly, you can't afford to be takin him to the doctor all the
time, you can't."
-"Public Aid practically cut me off, as far as money, and
they cut my Food Stamps. It was hard, it was really hard, and I
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said, 'Man, I might as well go on and quit working, and be on
Public Aid, because I'm not getting anywhere."
-"I didn't have any money. I didn't have any more working
than I did on Public Aid. I said, 'This just doesn't make any
sense!' It seems like I was supposed to have more, but I didn't.
I said, 'Forget this, I can't get a baby-sitter like I want to anyway,
so I'm just going to sit at home on my butt and get my Public
Aid'-that was my attitude."
One respondent, (who had worked continuously for the
last eleven years) when asked what she thought the welfare
department could do to help people such as herself, said:
-"They could stop taking your money every time you make
it!! That's the way I feel, Then, if they didn't take your money,
that would give a chance where you want to work. They take
too much percentage of your money when you work ... the
working people catch it, that's who catch it! You ain't benefittin'
nothing!"
The point here seems clear-it certainly appears to be clear
to the women as they tell it: that the structure of the AFDC sys-
tem brings heavy financial disincentives to bear on the question
of whether or not to work.
The experience of going out to get a job, and then finding
the cash grant and Food Stamps reduced in such a way that
they were actually worse off financially was not lost on them.
Also, the inability to purchase medical insurance on a minimum
wage job was mentioned again and again.
The primary disincentives, which came up over and over,
have to do with how the AFDC system interacts with the labor
market. Women found again and again that when they would
work at the low-wage, part-time jobs realistically available to
them, they would suffer such a reduction in welfare grants,
Food Stamps, and medical coverage that they often were worse
off by working than by staying on AFDC.
Discussion
As the respondents described the various incentives and
disincentives that bear on the decision to enter the job market,
From Welfare to Work 81
it appears that the strongest incentives are internal ones, in the
psychosocial domain, and the strongest disincentives are ex-
ternal, in the impinging environment. The strongest incentives,
or forces that support work, are the feelings of enjoyment of
mingling, socializing, being active and busy, the pride, the self-
esteem, the escape from boredom at home, the sense of being
independent and in control, and the dream of someday being
free of AFDC.
The strongest disincentives, by contrast, come from outside
the women. Those disincentives reside in the structure of the
labor market and of the AFDC system. These structures interact
to make work, as it is available to these women, not profitable.
These data indicate that the problem for this sample in
leaving the welfare rolls to enter the labor market is not one
of motivation. On the contrary, the motivation to work is fre-
quently present, as is corroborated by other studies (Goodwin,
1972; Sarri, 1985; Wodarski et al., 1986). The problem lies in the
experience of being worse off by working. The respondents gave
repeated examples of the experience of job-hunting, beginning
to work, and then discovering they were losing money and/or
health coverage by so doing.
It is the "Catch-22" of women who start working in the
labor market available to them, and find that they are worse off
than when they were unemployed and on welfare. Although
the women put the blame for this problem on welfare, it more
accurately is the interaction of the AFDC regulations with the
secondary labor market that penalizes the women in this study.
Looking at the AFDC system from the point of view of
behavior theory, and what is known about the power of positive
and negative reinforcement, it seems clear that the system fails
to reward the desired behavior (working), and in effect punishes
it through the rapid and extensive withdrawal of benefits and
supports. If the respondents in this study had available to them
jobs that provided earnings above the poverty level, then the
response of AFDC to their work effort would not be damaging.
As it is, however, the respondents are caught in a vicious cycle
in which employment leads to increased hardship, which then
creates an incentive to move back on to welfare.
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Recommendations
Welfare policy reflects a view of recipients as a homogeneous
group in regard to certain characteristics such as a lack of basic
job skills and experience, and which are true of only a segment
of the welfare population (Duncan, 1984; Weinberg, 1989). The
women in this study are experienced at finding jobs and at
working, and they have many positive things to say about the
experience of working.
For women such as these, the education and job training
programs (accompanied by threats for non-compliance) con-
tained in recent welfare reform (Family Support Act of 1988) may
be an inappropriate response to their problems. Their problem
is neither unwillingness nor inability to work. What they need
is some way of increasing their earnings. This could be done
in one of several ways.
One way is simply to return to the pre-1981 work incentive
program through AFDC, where inadequate wages were supple-
mented through welfare to bring the family above poverty. This
arrangement also provided health insurance for the family, as
well as support for day care costs.
Another possibility is to raise the minimum wage. The U.S.
Congress has recently done this, but due to opposition from the
Administration, was not able to raise it sufficiently to bring the
earned income of women such as those in this sample above
poverty (Gendel, 1989).
A third possibility is to supplement inadequate wages
through the income tax system. This is currently done, to an
extent, with the Earned Income Tax Credit, but, as with the
minimum wage, it is not at a high enough level to bring most
working poor families out of poverty (Moynihan, 1986).
Whatever mechanism for supplementing inadequate wages
is used, there needs to be provision for health care and child
care on an indefinite basis. Currently, women who exit wel-
fare via earnings are entitled to twelve months of health care
coverage and child care subsidy (Family Support Act of 1988).
However, it is fallacious to assume that within twelve months
the women will have increased their earnings enough to cover
health insurance and full payment of child care. The jobs these
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women perform pay sub-poverty wages, and have very flat
wage scales (Bluestone & Harrison, 1986). Raises reported by
respondents were typically .10 or .15 per hour-hardly enough
to enable them to purchase health insurance or good child care
for their children.
In our current economy, it is not realistic to assume that all
welfare recipients can be trained and educated to hold jobs that
will bring their incomes above poverty. Goodwin (1989, p. 63)
found that research from recent work-training programs sup-
ported findings from previous decades: that "work training is
useful, but in itself will not deplete welfare rolls." Gueron (1987,
1988) found that welfare-to-work programs are most effective
with chronically unemployed recipients, the so-called "hard-
core." She found that with work-experienced recipients (such
as the ones in this study), the education and training programs
available did not raise their incomes significantly. The problem
here is a labor market one: welfare employment programs focus
on the supply side of the market, but do nothing to address
issues on the demand side, such as wages and benefits available.
Many writers (see for example, Bluestone & Harrison, 1987;
Ellwood, 1988) are predicting that our economy is going to
produce an increasing percentage of low-skill, low-wage jobs,
primarily in the service sector. The women in this research
sample already possess the necessary skill and experience to
hold these jobs.
The reality for these women is that they likely never will
have "careers" in the middle-class understanding of that term
(Groves, Cassella, & Jacobs, 1982; Hooks, 1984). They can,
however, have satisfactory work lives. Recall that most of the
women in this study did not complain about the nature of their
work; rather, they complained that working did not enable them
to support their families in a manner any better than being on
welfare, and sometimes made them worse off.
What is called for is a policy that supports existing motiva-
tion to work. Currently, our welfare policy is in effect punishing
the desired behavior by withdrawal of supports when a recipi-
ent enters the labor market. The problem that is not addressed
in current welfare reform is the reality of the labor market that
awaits many recipients leaving the welfare rolls.
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